Is Setting up Barriers to Entry Always Profitable for Incumbent Firms?  by Dilek, Serkan & Top, Seyfi
 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  58 ( 2012 )  774 – 782 
1877-0428 © 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the 8th International Strategic Management Conference
doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2012.09.1055 
8th International Strategic Management Conference 
Is Setting Up Barriers To Entry Always Profitable For 
Incumbent Firms? 
Serkan Dileka* , Seyfi Topb  
a Kastamonu University, Kuzeykent Campus, Kastamonu, Turkey 
b anbul, Turkey 
 
Abstract 
Barriers to entry have been subject to so many studies examining competition conditions and markets in industrial 
and micro economics literature. Markets with no entry barriers realize better performance and in these markets long 
run equilibrium actualized when average total costs equal to price. Generally firms can set up higher prices than their 
average total costs when entry is not free. Therefore incumbent firms prefer to set up entry barriers and avoid 
competition. However in two-sided markets new entrants can provide benefits to incumbent firms. So, in these 
conditions incumbent firms chose to reduce or eliminate barriers to entry. We examined this type of markets and their 
effects to market equilibrium and incumbent firms.  
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1. Introduction 
According to widespread wisdom, profits in an industry decrease as the number of firms increases. 
Generally this is true. If the number of firms in an industry is restricted, incumbent firms can obtain 
excess profits in an oligopoly or monopoly market. Therefore incumbent firms usually set up barriers to 
entry and deter potential entrants from starting business in an industry. There are many types of barriers 
including absolute cost advantage, product differentiation, economies of scale etc. Though some barriers 
are sourced from the characteristics of market (such as economies of scale) there are some barriers to 
entry which can be created by incumbents who want to discourage new entrants and reduce potential 
competition. Brand loyalty, advertisements, distribution channels are some of barriers that can be adjusted 
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by incumbents. The purpose of the present study is to query, if setting up barriers is profitable for 
 
The article proceeds in the following manner. First we briefly review literature about barriers to entry 
in industrial and micro economics. We examined the general conditions, the results, reasons of the game 
between incumbent and new entrant firms. Second we reviewed previous studies about two-sided 
markets. Then, we explained why incumbents can benefit from new entrants in two-sided markets and 
chose the induction in barriers to entry instead of increasing it. Third we summarize the results. This 
study is aimed to be contribution to literature and starting point for next studies. 
 
1.  
Barriers to entry occupied an important place in micro economic theory and industrial economics. The 
long run equilibrium of the firm is at the point at which it is a long run average total costs equal price in 
perfect competition markets. If price is bigger than average total cost, potential entrant firms will 
recognize excess profits and enter competition game. After new entrants, the equilibrium profits and 
prices decrease to normal level. In shortly, firms will have no excess profits in perfect competition 
markets because of free entries in long run. However, in monopolies and oligopolies, it is not free to enter 
a market. Therefore incumbent firms in monopolies or oligopolies continue to earn excess profits in long 
, because of the existence of barriers to entry in these 
markets. Generally barriers to entry are higher in pure monopoly or tight oligopoly markets. Main 
oligopoly models -such as Cournot, Bertrand, Stackelberg- study about the game of incumbent and new 
entrant after one firm decide to enter a market (Varian, 1992: 262). Barriers to entry also effect long run 
cteristics many industrial 
economists interested with in entry barriers and market equilibrium (Elzinga and Mills, 1996: 810; Aidis 
and Adachi, 2007:391). 
Monopolies generally prefer to set up a barrier to entry, because they want to continue to get excess 
profits in both short and long run. The first definition of barriers to entry was done by Bain (1956). A 
barrier to entry is a factor that reduces motivation and ability of potential entrants to enter a new market 
although they know excess profits of incumbent firms in this market. Also barriers to entry can be thought 
of a cost of a firm that is seeking to enter a market or decides to enter a market (Karakaya, 2002: 380). 
Gable and others (1995: 211) made another definition of barriers to entry by saying that they refer to 
deterrents or obstacles preventing new firms from engaging in production or sale of products or services.  
According to the theory that mentions that barriers affect the market performance, there are many 
empirical studies about entry barriers (Niu and others, 2011; Karakaya and Stahl, 1989; Campos and 
Iooty, 2007:346-363; Burke and To, 2001). Some studies have different results than the traditional 
economic theory. Burke and To (2001) studied on interesting model in which reduction in entry barriers 
have no decreasing effect on industry price. In this model incumbent firms buy-off potential entry through 
higher wages. If employees of incumbent firm enter a market by constructing a new firm their salaries can 
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be increased. In short run, the result is increased salaries and no entry.  In long run, incumbent firm limit 
the number of employees because of entry threat and increase salaries. So long run equilibrium is realized 
as higher prices and lower output. The study of Burke and To (2001) is a good example that shows 
reduced entry barriers can be resulted as decreased output. 
There are two types of barriers to entry which are called endogenous and exogenous barriers. 
Exogenous barriers are those, which are borne from the structure of market conditions and cannot be 
controlled by incumbent firms. But endogenous barriers are created and maintained by incumbent firms 
(Gable and others, 1995: 211). Greer (1992) made different classification. According to this classification 
barriers to entry are divided into two groups which are structural (technical) and behavioural (strategic). 
 
a) Absolute cost advantage from incumbents because of patents, secret production methods etc.  
b) Product differentiation advantages of incumbents and  
c) Economies of scale advantages.  
Behavioural (strategic) barriers are set up by incumbents to deter potential entrants. Examples of 
behavioural barriers are increased advertising scale, predatory pricing and new arrangements. Porter 
contributed to literature by classifying entry barriers in six types (Johansson and Elg, 2002; pp.395). 
These types are economies of scale, product differentiation, customer switching costs, capital 
requirements, government policy and access to distribution channels. We can list most popular barriers to 
entry that are studied in literature are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. List of Barriers to Entry 
Cost advantage of incumbents Product differentiation of incumbents Capital requirements 
Customer switching costs Access to distribution channels Government policy 
Advertising  Number of competitors Research and Development 
Price Technology and technological change Market concentration 
Seller Concentration Divisionalization Brand name, trademark 
Sunk costs Selling Expenses Incumbent expected reaction to market 
entry 
Possession of strategic raw materials   
Source: Niu and Others, 2011: 70. 
 
We studied on which market conditions and types, endogenous 
barriers to entry. Suppose that incumbent firm is moving with a motivation of higher profits. If his sales 
and profits increase with the new entrant firm, he will not be against the new entrant. In this condition 
incumbent firm does not want to increase the endogenous barriers but wants to encourage entrants by 
decreasing them. We examined if incumbent sellers prefer to encourage rivals in two-sided markets. 
2. INCUMBENT AND ENTRANT FIRM 
Now we will show how new entrant firm increases profit of incumbent firm by using algebraic 
method. For simplicity we neglect exogenous barriers to entry and study only on endogenous barriers to 
entry. Suppose that we have two periods. In first period market style is monopoly and in second period it 
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is duopoly. If incumbent firm is active in monopoly its demand will be equal to market demand at the 
same time. So we can show its total revenue by equation (1) in first period. P denotes price and q denotes 
demand quantity. If we neglect total cost the profit will be equal to Total Revenue (TR). 
qpTR tt .                      (1) 
In second period new entrant firm participate to market and the firms share market demand. We 
suppose that each firm share demand equally. So demand for both incumbent and entrant firm is q/2. We 
neglect again total cost and new profit function for both firms will be like in (2). 
2
.11
qpTR tt                  (2) 
As it is seen in (1) and (2), profit for incumbent firm decreases. While the market demand is constant, 
number of firms increases. But what will happen if a new entrant does some magic and increases total 
sales in market? In this condition we use coefficient k to show the increase in total demand. If k is equal 
to 0, the contribution of new firm to market demand is zero. If it is 1, market demand increases %100. 
qpTRTR tt .1 ). 
2
)1(.11
kqpTR tt                   
In which conditions we have k coefficient such that it is positive integer? rch about the 







kpqpqkpqkqppqTRTRTR tt              (4) 
It is also equal to difference between profits in first and second period, in which conditions we will get 
the result which is at least zero. 
For which extra amount of total demand, incumbent firm will give up setting barriers to entry? Here 
we assume that incumbent firm has enough power to set up barriers to entry in a market. The difference 
between the demand of incumbent firm before and after new firm was calculated as
2
kpqpq . If 
2
kpqpq gets positive value then we can say that incumbent firm has more total revenue (TR) in first 
period (when the market is monopoly). On the contrary if 
2
kpqpq gets negative, it is obviously clear 
that the incumbent firm has more Total Revenue (TR) in second period (when rival firm comes to 
market). As the value of 
2
kpqpq gets bigger, incumbent firm will clearly understand that its profit is 
bigger before the entrance and it will set up barriers to entry. 
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3. TWO-SIDED MARKETS 
First suppose that the market is two-sided. Two-sided markets differ from classical market types and 
have been studied since last decade (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Armstrong, 2006; Chakravorti, 2003). In 
these types of markets both buyers and sellers benefit from the number of opposite sides. We mean that 
buyers will be more wealthy if there are more sellers and vice versa. Classical examples for that type of 
markets are dating clubs, credit card markets, shopping malls, video games, browsers, operating systems, 
newspapers, TV networks etc (Rochet and Tirole, 2003: 993-994). For instance, in credit card market 
consumers (buyers) interest with the number of merchants (sellers) who accept credit cards as payment 
tools. Also merchants take into consideration the number of consumers who are willing to use credit cards 
for their payments (Chakravorti, 2003: 51).  
In two-sided markets there are three actors including buyers, sellers and platforms (Rochet and Tirole, 
2003; pp.993) (in credit card market also financial institutions which are called as issuer and acquirer are 
another actors (Chakravorti, 2003: 51)). In our study we are not interested in competition between 
platforms but deal with competition between sellers in two-sided markets. Also we neglect 
multihomeness which occurs when a consumer subscribe more than one platform (Rochet and Tirole; 
2003: 54). In other words we suppose that every consumer chooses only one good and subscribes only 
one platform. Generally platforms have right to decide the number of sellers or buyers. But we assume 
that platforms do not restrict the number of sellers or buyers. They just determine prices, get profits and 
have no power and willingness to consider about the number of sellers. In addition to this, sometimes 
there can be constraint on the number of sellers as it is in shopping malls. The numbers of shops in a mall 
are constrained with the physical place in mall building. We ignore these kinds of constraints; shortly our 
assumption is that there are no constraints on the number of sellers. 
Under these conditions what is the impact of new firms on a market? If new entrant starts business in 
a market then consumers will benefit from the number of sellers. use of 
increased selection facilities. So consumers, who are outside the market, will find it profitable to be active 
in a market. As a result incumbent firm will witness that the number of consumers and demand are not 
constant but increasing. New entrant will bring new consumers to market. As new entrant firm contributes 
to total consumer number, coefficient k becomes bigger. The value of k coefficient depends on new 
firms  potential. Consequently if incumbent firm see that the new firm makes enough contribution to total 
demand then it will not set up barriers.  
n incumbent shop 
which is active in a shopping mall. If a new and famous firm starts business in same shopping mall, then 
some customers will decide to visit this mall. Their only aim is to search if there is something good to buy 
for them 
showcases. Probably they will like some of the goods which are on sale and buy them. Briefly it will be 
witnessed that total demand in shopping mall increases and incumbent firms earn more by selling more 
goods.  
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Proposition: In two-sided markets if there is no multihomeness and numbers of sellers are not 
restricted by any reason, then incumbent sellers will find profitable not to deter entries but to encourage 
new entrants. 
Proof: First we remind our assumptions. We suppose that all of buyers are singlehome. Namely, they 
only buy or use one good. Additionally, decision about the number of sellers or buyers is not restricted by 
platform administration and there is no constraint on the number of sellers. Also the goods of merchants 
are not homogeneous but rivals. 
We should make connections between utility and number of sellers. If utility of sellers increase with 
the increase in number of sellers then we will prove that incumbent sellers benefit from the increase in 
sellers. So incumbent firms will not deter but encourage entry of other sellers. 
We introduce utility functions of buyers and sellers which was studied by Armstrong (2006: 672). For 
simplicity we studied on monopoly platform as Armstrong did. If first agent is seller then U1 will denote 
utility function of seller. In this case U2 denotes utility function of buyers. 
                          1211 pnU                         (5) 
2122 pnU  
Coefficients 1 and 2 measures the benefits of agents who enjoys from interacting with the other 
group. 1p and 2p are prices for interacting in platform. Platform administration only set up prices to 
participate platform rs of sellers or buyers. For simplicity we suppose that 
platform charged fixed prices to both sellers and buyers. Let this price be p.  
                             pnU 211                       (6) 
pnU 122  
Equations (6) make connections with utility function of agent and numbers of other agents. However 
we need the connection between utility function and numbers of sellers. So, we should try to find 
equations that connect utility and number of sellers. The equations will be in the form of U1=f(n1). 
Also number of buyers and sellers depends on the utility functions. According to Armstrong (2006: 
672) they can be defined mathematically as 
                                    )( 11 un                              (7) 
)( 22 un  
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We said that first agents are sellers and second agents are buyers. From the equation (6) utility 
functions of buyers are pnU 122 . Let 1n and 2n be linear functions. So, they can be defined 
mathematically as   
2111 .Un                          (8) 
                                                    4232 .Un  
1 3 are coefficients that define contribution of one unit of extra utility to the number of sellers 
and buyers. Numbe  be negative number 1 2 3 4 are positive 
integers. Number of buyers can be written by using equations (6) and (8). 
4312341232 ).( pnpnn              (9) 
With the help of equation (9) we can write 43123 pn instead of n2 then this provides us to 
eliminate n2 in equations (6). Although seller s utility depends on the number of buyers we will see that it 
also depends on the number of sellers. 1 in terms of n1. 
ppnnU )()( 43123111                     (10) 
Sellers are rational agents who want to maximize their utility or profits. (10) is a function with one 
variable. Prices are fixed so utility function has only one variable (n1). If we calculate derivatives of (10) 
with respect to n1 we will find the slope of utility function of seller. 
23111 / dndU                 (11) 
As it is seen in (13) if number of sellers increase, the utility of other sellers increase, too. It is valid for 
all sellers including incumbent sellers. In this condition the increase in utility of sellers is constant and is 
equal to 231 . Briefly the new firms have positive impact on utility of incumbents, so incumbents can 
decide to encourage entries in a market. Also it is clear that (11) has positive result. Therefore U1 is 
increasing function. In addition to this, equation (11) does not depend on the variable n1 and it is obvious 
that equation (10) is linear function.  
These results explain why shops in a shopping mall prefer rival shops and do not worry about 
competition. Although traditional economic theory says that new rivals increase competition and decrease 
utility and profit of incumbent firm, equation (11) shows that in two-sided markets in benefit 
can increase because of the new entrant firms. 
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Conclusion 
Traditional economic theory gives importance to entry barriers for the impact of them to market 
equilibrium.  Micro economic theory says that as competition and number of rival firm increases, price 
decreases and utility of incumbent firms decreases. In long run because of free entry and exit, prices will 
equal to average costs. Therefore incumbent firms generally do not want more rivals and agree to deter 
entries. Critical question is that if in some conditions deterring bad for incumbent firms? We searched the 
answer of this question in our study by thinking about new market type (two-sided markets) which has 
-sided markets 
(especially Armstrong (2006)) and show that incumbent sellers benefit from new entrant firms and they 
see that new entrant firms increase both market and firm demand together. Because of that reason 
incumbents prefer to encourage entries, not to set up barriers in two-sided markets. While we are studying 
we used mathematical methods. This result is contradicting with traditional economic theories that 
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